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WHAT  ASPECT  OF  the  American  economy  has  changed  most  in  the 
twenty-five years since Brookings Papers on Economic Activity first be- 
gan appearing? If you took a poll of economic journalists,  businessmen, 
or policy  intellectuals  other  than professional  economists,  globaliza- 
tion-the  growing integration of the United States with the world econ- 
omy-would  probably top the list.  It is  now conventional  wisdom  in 
many circles  that the growth of world trade and investment  has trans- 
formed the ground rules for economic  policy. 
Admittedly,  many international economists  regard the popular con- 
viction that unprecedented globalization has changed everything as con- 
siderably exaggerated; Americans are still so taken with the novelty  of 
extensive  international trade that they have yet to acquire a sense of per- 
spective about its importance. Even today the shares of imports and ex- 
ports in America's  GDP are only  about half of what they were  in the 
United  Kingdom thirty years ago; the U.S.  economy  is not now,  and 
may never be, as dependent on exports as Britain was during the reign 
of  Queen  Victoria.  Nonetheless,  international trade has certainly  in- 
creased considerably  since the 1960s. In 1960 the share of trade-mea- 
sured as the average of imports and exports  of goods  and services-in 
America's GDP was 4.7 percent; in 1994 it was 11.4 percent, an increase 
of more than 100 percent.  While the growth of trade has not been quite 
as dramatic in other advanced countries,  it has also been considerable: 
the average OECD country had a trade share of  12.5 percent in 1960, 
18.6 percent in 1990. And a number of developing  countries  have seen 
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their trade explode:  China, virtually isolated from the world economy 
before 1978, may now export 25 percent of its GDP. 
Why has world trade grown, and what are the consequences  of that 
growth? These are surprisingly disputed issues.  This is true to a limited 
extent because  of disagreements  among professional  economists,  nota- 
bly about the relative importance of trade and technological  change in 
causing the growing inequality of wages in advanced nations. Even more 
striking is the gap between professional opinion and the broader conven- 
tional wisdom.  There are a number of cases  in which the perceptions of 
noneconomists  who believe  themselves  to be well-informed  about the 
world economy  are radically at odds with what research seems  to indi- 
cate. To take a relatively mild example: most journalistic discussion  of 
the growth of world trade seems  to view growing integration as driven 
by a technological  imperative-to  believe  that improvements  in trans- 
portation and communication technology  constitute an irresistible force 
dissolving  national  boundaries.  International  economists,  however, 
tend to view much, though not all, of the growth of trade as having essen- 
tially  political  causes,  seeing  its great expansion  after World War II 
largely as a result of the removal of the protectionist  measures that had 
constricted world markets since 1913. At least implicitly, therefore, they 
also tend to see the trend toward growing integration as potentially re- 
versible. 
And yet perhaps these disagreements  should not be all that surpris- 
ing. International trade is,  after all, the prime example  of a subject in 
which  it is essential  to take account  of general equilibrium, in which 
everything  affects  everything  else  in at least  two  ways.  The general- 
equilibrium aspects  of international economic  issues  can cause  confu- 
sion even among the experts.  For example,  how should one think about 
the effects  of technology  on income  distribution? Should one,  as Ed- 
ward Leamer  appears  to  believe,  model  the  effects  of  technological 
change by thinking of that change as occurring in isolation  in a single 
country that faces given world prices? ' Or should one, like most of those 
who  believe  that technological  change  is the  main cause  of rising in- 
equality,  think of it as happening simultaneously  in a number of coun- 
tries that collectively  constitute  a more or less closed  economy?  These 
two approaches can give radically different predictions. 
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And if even the professors can get confused,  the broader public-in- 
cluding commentators  who can sound convincing  but do not have the 
patience  to work through all the implications  of their ideas-is  all the 
more subject to befuddlement.  An astonishing amount of the public dis- 
cussion  of  international economic  issues,  among people  who  believe 
themselves  to be sophisticates,  involves  sheer misunderstanding of ac- 
counting identities;  and it goes  without saying that almost nobody un- 
derstands such abstruse concepts  as comparative advantage. 
In any case,  this paper represents  an attempt to shed some light on 
the  causes  and implications  of  growing  world  trade.  The  issues  dis- 
cussed  here are the subject of a huge recent literature; the distinctive 
feature  of  the  analysis  in  this  paper  is  an  attempt  to  keep  in  mind 
throughout that world trade must be regarded as the outcome of a proc- 
ess  in which trade flows,  world prices,  wages,  and employment  are all 
simultaneously  determined. 
The paper is in five parts. The first part presents an overview of trends 
in world trade; it looks at the long-run evolution of world trade, and tries 
to identify those aspects of globalization that are truly new. The second 
part asks the question,  why has world trade increased?  The last three 
parts are devoted  to the issue that has created the most controversy  in 
recent discussions  of international trade: the effects of exports of manu- 
factures from the third world on wages  and employment  in the first. I 
begin by setting out a stylized,  minimalist general-equilibrium model of 
world  trade,  wages,  and employment,  and  suggest  a  set  of  ballpark 
parameters for that model.  I then turn to a theoretical  and numerical 
assessment  of  the  impact  of  the  new  phenomenon  of  low-wage  ex- 
ports under two  different  sets  of assumptions.  First is a "European" 
approach, in which the advanced world as a whole  is assumed to have 
inflexible relative wages, and in which the effects of trade are manifested 
in changes in employment.  As far as I know, this approach is new-the 
rapidly growing literature on trade and wages has consistently  assumed 
that wages are flexible and that full employment  is maintained. It turns 
out, however,  that the rigid-wage case  is not only arguably of consid- 
erable empirical relevance,  but also has some  major advantages  in al- 
lowing us to interpret the data. Nonetheless,  however convenient  it may 
be to assume that relative wages are fixed, this is obviously  not true for 
all OECD nations.  This analysis  is therefore followed  by a more prob- 
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tures  exports  using  an  "American"  approach,  in  which  wages  are 
flexible. 
The Growth  of World  Trade:  An Overview 
It  is  a late-twentieth-century  conceit  that we  invented  the  global 
economy just yesterday.  In fact, world markets achieved an impressive 
degree of integration during the second  half of the nineteenth century. 
Indeed,  if one wants a specific  date for the beginning of a truly global 
economy,  one might well choose  1869, the year in which both the Suez 
Canal and the Union Pacific railroad were completed.  By the eve of the 
First World War steamships and railroads had created markets for stan- 
dardized commodities,  like wheat  and wool,  that were fully global in 
their reach. Even the global flow of information was better than modern 
observers,  focused  on electronic  technology,  tend to realize: the first 
submarine telegraph cable was laid under the Atlantic in 1858, and by 
1900 all of the world's major economic  regions could effectively  commu- 
nicate instantaneously.  How has world trade evolved  since that impres- 
sive  beginning,  and what aspects  of the current growth in world trade 
are truly new? 
Trade as a Share of Output: A Long-term Perspective 
Although the volume of world trade has been marked by a steady up- 
ward trend since about 1950, a longer-term perspective  reveals that such 
growing integration is by no means necessary.  On the contrary, between 
1913 and the early post-World  War II years most of the world's econo- 
mies turned inward, and the share of world output that entered into in- 
ternational trade declined  substantially.  Much of the growth in trade 
since  1950 therefore simply represents simply a recovery to former lev- 
els. Indeed, to the extent that it is possible  to make comparisons,  world 
trade as a share of world output does not seem to have recovered  to its 
1913 level  until sometime  in the mid-1970s; only the growth since then 
truly represents a new degree of integration. 
Tables  1 and 2 show some indicative numbers. Table 1, derived from 
data assembled  by the World Bank,  shows  estimates  of merchandise 
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Table 1.  World Merchandise Exports as Percentage of GDP 
Percent 
1850  1880  1913  1950  1973  1985  1993 
5. la  9.8a  I11.9a  7.1  11.7  14.5  17.1 
Source:  World Bank,  (1995). 
a. OECD countries  only. 
Table 2.  Trade Shares in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany 
Percenta 
Country  1913  1950  1970  1987 
United  Kingdom  27.7  13.1  16.6  21.1 
United  States  3.9  2.9  4.4  7.4 
Germany  19.9  9.8  17.4  23.3 
Source:  Liesner  (1989). 
a.  Merchandise  trade, measured as the average of exports  and imports,  as a share of GDP. 
tury.2 The data show a marked increase in trade up to 1913; a substantial 
dropoff by 1950; and a recovery that has continued to the present, finally 
outstripping 1913 levels  sometime between  1973 and 1985. 
Table 2 shows merchandise trade, measured as the average of exports 
and imports, as a share of GDP for three major economies  since  1913. 
All three show the same pattern of dip and subsequent  rise. Although 
the United States had a slightly larger trade share in 1970 than in 1913, 
the United Kingdom and Germany were still below their 1913 trade lev- 
els; the general picture of world integration that did not exceed  early- 
twentieth-century  levels  until  sometime  well  into  the  1970s  is  thus 
broadly confirmed. 
In the last decade or so, the share of trade in world output has finally 
reached a level that is noticeably above its former peak. Nonetheless,  it 
would be hard to argue that the sheer volume of trade is now at a level 
that  marks  a  qualitative  difference  from  previous  experience.  The 
United  States,  in particular, remains considerably  less  dependent  on 
trade than major European countries have been for at least a century. 
Does  this mean,  then,  that there is nothing new  about the  kind of 
growth of world trade that has taken place over the last generation? No: 
while the overall volume  of trade has not increased  as much as might 
2.  Unfortunately,  the pre-World  War I data are only for OECD countries. 332  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
be expected,  the aggregates  conceal  several  novel features  of modern 
international trade. 
New Aspects  of  Trade 
It is possible  to identify  at least four new aspects  of modern world 
trade-new  in the sense that they did not have counterparts in the previ- 
ous golden age of the global economy.  These are the rise of intra-trade, 
trade in similar goods between similar countries; the ability of producers 
to slice up the value chain, breaking a production process into many geo- 
graphically separated  steps;  the resulting emergence  of supertraders, 
countries with extremely  high ratios of trade to GDP; and, the novelty 
that provokes the most anxiety, the emergence of large exports of manu- 
factured goods from low-wage  to high-wage nations. 
INTRA-TRADE.  As  already  pointed  out,  the  United  Kingdom  has 
been a highly trade-dependent nation since the mid-nineteenth century; 
measured as a share of the United Kingdom's output, trade is basically 
no higher now than it was in the high Victorian period. There have, how- 
ever, been some major changes in the composition  of British trade, both 
by commodity and region. Table 3 provides indicative numbers compar- 
ing British trade in 1913 and 1992. They show that in 1913 Britain was, to 
a good approximation, a nation that exported  manufactured goods  and 
imported raw materials, period; and it was a country that largely traded 
with raw material producers overseas.  By  1992 British imports as well 
as exports  consisted  largely of manufactured goods,  and most  of the 
country's  trade was with other European nations-that  is,  with coun- 
tries with similar resources.  It is also true that a high proportion of the 
trade among  industrial countries  appears  to  consist  of  intra-industry 
trade, two-way trade in goods in the same commodity class.  And it was 
Table 3.  Commodity and Geographical Composition of U.K.  Trade 
Percenta 
Exports of  Imports of  Exports  to  Imports from 
Year  manufactures  manufactures  Europe  Europe 
1913  75.5  20.2  39.5  44.6 
1992  81.9  78.4  63.8  63.7 
Source:  Mitchell (1988), Barraclough (1978), and Great Britain, Central Statistical  Office (1994). 
a.  Numbers  are  percentages  of  the  relevant  piece  of  trade.  Export  columns  indicate  percentage  of  total 
merchandise exports;  import columns  indicate percentage  of total merchandise  imports. Paul Krugman  333 
a striking feature of the growth in trade that followed major trade liberal- 
izations among industrial countries,  such as the formation of the EEC in 
1958 and the United  States-Canada  auto pact in 1965, that the bulk of 
the increase in trade consisted  of nearly balanced increases  in exports 
3  and imports within three-digit industrial categories. 
It is probably fair to say that the standard explanation for trade in sim- 
ilar products among similar countries  is that it is motivated  by econo- 
mies of scale in the production of differentiated products, although there 
remains some  skepticism.4 The important point for current purposes, 
however,  is that the rise of intra-trade depends on some ways in which 
the nature of "typical" manufactured products has changed since  1913. 
To  put it briefly,  manufactured goods  today  are more  complex  than 
those of our great-grandfathers' day; not only are they more finely differ- 
entiated, their manufacture involves  the use of a much greater variety of 
specialized intermediate goods (and intra-industry trade consists largely 
of trade in such intermediates).  Cotton textiles,  the principal British ex- 
port in the early stages  of industrialization,  were a fairly standardized 
product; one could not really imagine much two-way  trade in bolts of 
cloth. Furthermore, production involved only a few steps, from raw cot- 
ton to yarn to cloth, leaving little scope for the vertical disintegration of 
the industry. By contrast, modern manufactures-take  the overused but 
inevitable example of automobiles-are  highly differentiated, and their 
production involves  a number of different stages.  If these  stages  take 
place in different countries, they become a source of increased trade vol- 
ume; so that it is not surprising to see  Germans driving Hondas  while 
Japanese drive BMWs. 
SLICING  UP  THE  VALUE  ADDED  CHAIN.  In Detroit's  Institute  of 
Fine Arts there is a remarkable room whose walls are painted with four 
stunning  murals by  Diego  Rivera.  The  Rivera  murals,  completed  in 
1933, show in considerable  detail the operations of Ford's River Rouge 
industrial complex-a  giant facility that combined  at a single site blast 
furnaces,  rolling mills, engine casting, body stamping, and assembly  of 
complete automobiles.  The Rouge plant was, in effect,  a facility that in- 
gested coke and iron ore at one end and extruded passenger cars from 
the other. 
Although Rivera's murals were intended as a celebration of the power 
3.  See, in particular, the papers by Grubel (1967) and Balassa (1966). 
4.  The canonical reference is Helpman and Krugman (1985). 334  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
of modern industry (and also, to his patron's dismay, a condemnation of 
its brutality), they now have a decidedly  archaic feel.  Part of that sense 
of old-fashioned industry comes from the very degree of integration that 
seemed  so impressive  at the time. What are all those  disparate opera- 
tions doing in the same facility? Why are they not being done at special- 
ized plants scattered around the globe? 
It would be interesting to know how many facilities the average iron 
atom in a 1995 Ford automobile  has passed  through (or better yet,  to 
know how many miles it has traveled, from the time it enters the gate of 
the steel plant to the time it rolls off the assembly  line). But it is gener- 
ally believed (with little hard statistical evidence)  that the trend in manu- 
facturing has been to slice  up the value chain-to  produce a good in a 
number of stages in a number of locations,  adding a little bit of value at 
each stage. 
Such slicing up could greatly increase the potential volume of interna- 
tional trade. In 1913, a given consumer good could, to a rough approxi- 
mation, be exported only once.  Today it can be exported many times: a 
good that is produced in one country may be assembled  from compo- 
nents produced in other countries,  and these in turn may be assembled 
from subcomponents  produced in yet other countries.  As a result,  the 
trade involved in the global production of a final good may easily be sev- 
eral times the value added in all stages  of that production. 
This increased potential for trade may help explain the next new as- 
pect of world trade: the emergence of supertrading nations. 
SUPERTRADING  ECONOMIES.  Global  trade  as a percentage  of global 
output is,  even  now,  only  moderately  higher than it was in 1913. The 
most  trade-oriented  economies,  however,  have  much  higher  trade 
shares than ever seen before. As far as the available data indicate, there 
was no country in 1913 whose exports exceeded  50 percent of GDP. To- 
day there are at least six such countries:5 
Exports as percentage 
of GDP, 1990 
Singapore  174 
Hong Kong  144 
Malaysia  78 
5.  World Bank (1994). Paul Krugman  335 
Belgium  70 
Ireland  64 
Netherlands  52 
The emergence  of  supertrading economies  clearly  depends  on the 
ability of modern industry to slice up the value chain, so that the value 
of exports can be substantially larger than the value added in the export 
industry. This is a fortiori true for Singapore and Hong Kong, where ex- 
ports actually  exceed  GDP (alias,  value  added in the domestic  econ- 
omy). But it must also be true for all the other countries shown,  since it 
is virtually certain that at least 60 percent of the employment  and value 
added even in small countries is generated in nontradable sectors; thus 
a trade share of much more than 30-40  percent can only arise when ex- 
ports involve adding a fairly small amount of value to imported interme- 
diate goods. 
Of the countries listed above, Belgium and the Netherlands represent 
something of a special case.  They are best thought of as part of an inte- 
grated economic  region that comprises  northern France and, most im- 
portant, the Ruhr and nearby areas of Germany; different pieces  of a 
productive process tend to be spread across this region in much the same 
way that manufacturing plants in the modern U.S.  automobile industry 
tend to be scattered across a fairly wide area of the Midwest. 
The  other  countries  in  the  supertrader class,  however,  represent 
something  different:  they  are all low-wage  manufacturing platforms. 
That is,  they are locations  to which  semifinished  products are sent to 
have  labor-intensive  operations  performed  on  them,  and from  there 
shipped on for further work. Ireland, where wages are high by Chinese 
standards but low by European standards, plays this role on a local ba- 
sis; the Asian supertraders play this role globally. 
One of the effects of the sliced-up value chain in world trade has been 
to weaken the traditional link between  the population of a country and 
its trade share. There is still a strong inverse correlation: it is no accident 
that the United States has a lower trade share than any other advanced 
nation, or that Japan has the second  lowest.  But in 1990 Belgium,  with 
almost ten million people,  had a trade share twice that of Iceland,  with 
only  255,000.  The point is that Iceland  is not,  like  Belgium,  situated 
squarely in the middle of an industrial complex; and Iceland's relatively 
high wages,  supported by fish exports,  ruled it out as a manufacturing 336  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
platform along the lines of Ireland (although Reykjavik and Cork are ap- 
proximately the same shipping distance from Rotterdam). 
LOW-WAGE  MANUFACTURING  EXPORTERS.  Finally,  the novel  as- 
pect of trade that has created the most controversy  and concern is the 
rapid growth of manufactured exports from low-wage,  newly industrial- 
izing economies  (NIEs). 
It seems likely that the rise of NIE exports has something to do with 
the slicing up of the value chain. In the early stages of the NIE phenome- 
non, when rapid growth was limited to the Asian "tiger" economies,  it 
was common  to hear doubts expressed  about the possibilities  for such 
growth on a really large scale.  Surely a second  wave  of manufacturing 
exporters would soon be competing for the same limited markets-ap- 
parel,  toys,  and a few  other  labor-intensive  goods-that  were  being 
served by the "Gang of Four"? And surely there would be an insufficient 
range of suitable products  to allow  rapid growth of manufactured ex- 
ports from, to take an unlikely candidate, mainland China! 
What has happened,  however,  is that it has proved possible  to find 
expanded  niches  for labor-intensive  production by slicing up the pro- 
duction of goods traditionally viewed  as skill-, capital-, or technology- 
intensive  and putting the labor-intensive  slices  in low-wage  locations. 
To take what has become a classic example, a notebook computer looks 
like a high-technology  product; but while the American microprocessor 
and the Japanese flat-panel display are indeed high-tech, the plastic shell 
that surrounds them and the wiring that connects  them are not,  so the 
assembly of notebook computers becomes  an NIE industry. 
Incidentally,  the effect of the sliced-up value chain on low-wage  ex- 
ports is one  area in which  the conventional  wisdom  among business 
writers seems to be precisely  wrong. It is often said that labor costs  are 
now such a low share of total costs that low wages cannot be a significant 
competitive  advantage.  But when businesspeople  say this, they do not 
mean that labor costs  have declined  as a share of value added: on the 
contrary, the division of value added between capital and labor has been 
impressively  stable over time. What they mean, instead, is that because 
of the growing vertical disintegration of industry the value added by a 
given manufacturing facility  is likely to be only a small fraction of the 
value of its shipments; and thus the labor share of that value added is 
also a small fraction of costs,  which are dominated by the cost of inter- 
mediate inputs. But this vertical disintegration, or slicing up of the value Paul  Krugman  337 
Table 4.  Exports of Manufactured Goods from Newly Industrializing Economies 
Percentage  of GDP in destination 
All industrial 
Year  economies  European  Union  United States 
1970  0.24  0.22  0.28 
1990  1.61  1.30  1.91 
Source:  Exports  from UNCTAD  (1994); GDP from OECD,  Nationial Accountits. 
chain, creates a greater, not a smaller opportunity to relocate production 
to low-wage locations. 
The reasons for the explosion  of exports and more generally of eco- 
nomic growth in NIEs are deep and deeply disputed questions.  What is 
clear, however,  is that NIE export of manufactures, a phenomenon that 
was  essentially  nonexistent  twenty-five  years  ago,  has become  a sig- 
nificant feature of the world economy.  Table 4 shows the growth of man- 
ufactures  exports  from the  NIEs,  measured  as  a  share of  advanced 
country GDP. In addition to showing that these exports have effectively 
emerged out of nowhere, the table also makes the point that they are still 
not very large as a share of total OECD spending. 
Why  Has World  Trade  Grown? 
When economic  commentators  try to explain why world trade has 
grown faster than world output, they generally offer one of two explana- 
tions. The explanation most popular with journalists stresses the effects 
of technology:  Lower costs  of transportation and the growing speed of 
communications  have  made  the  world  a smaller place.  International 
economists,  while  paying  some  attention  to this  explanation,  tend to 
stress political factors to at least an equal extent; they point to the role 
of the GATT and, more recently,  of unilateral liberalizing measures by 
developing  countries.  It is also important to realize that the volume  of 
international  trade  depends  to  some  degree  on  how  boundaries  are 
drawn-for  any given  geography  of  world  production,  the  measured 
volume of international trade will depend on which  shipments are de- 
fined as international, and so some of the apparent change in world trade 
may simply represent changes in these definitions. 338  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
Political  Factors 
It is difficult to quantify protectionism.  Tariff rates can be measured, 
although there is still a problem of interpreting ex post data: to take the 
extreme case,  a country that imposes  prohibitive tariffs on some goods 
may have  a low  tariff rate on all of the goods  it continues  to import. 
Nonetheless,  there is no question that the general profile of world pro- 
tectionism since the early twentieth century has been the inverse of that 
of world trade: during the interwar period there was a proliferation of 
tariffs, import quotas,  and exchange  controls;  from World War II on- 
ward there has been a general trend toward freer trade. The correspon- 
dence between the time profile of trade policy and that of trade shares is 
prima facie evidence  that political factors have played a major, perhaps 
dominant role in the growth of world trade since  1950. In fact,  a first- 
pass story about the growth of world trade might run as follows:  the key 
technologies  that created a global economy  were the railroad, the steam- 
ship, and the telegraph.  Everything  since then has represented  only a 
marginal improvement.  Thus very large-scale  world trade emerged  in 
the days of the Pax Britannica. Politics then killed that first global econ- 
omy; with the gradual restoration of a relatively free trade environment 
under the  Pax Americana,  the global  economy  was  gradually recon- 
structed, and the world economy  more or less reached its previous level 
of integration by 1980. 
It is possible  to elaborate  on this story in several  ways.  First,  it is 
worth pointing out that the pre-World  War I world economy  was not 
exactly  characterized by free trade. Indeed, the two largest economies, 
the  United  States  and Germany,  were  frankly protectionist.  Thus  it 
should not be surprising that the closer approximation to free trade that 
has been achieved  in recent years has brought world trade somewhat 
above  early-twentieth-century  levels,  nor that-as  shown  in table 2- 
the once-protectionist  United States and Germany now have noticeably 
larger trade shares than they did in 1913, while then-free-trading Britain 
does not. 
Second, it is important to be aware that the progress toward free trade 
in the postwar period has not entirely taken place through GATT negoti- 
ations, nor for that matter among the OECD countries.  In recent years 
the most important moves toward free trade have been unilateral actions 
by developing countries,  many of which have turned away from the im- Paul Kruigman  339 
port-substitution policies of the past. Such moves do not only affect the 
developing  countries: because  trade liberalization increases  exports  as 
well  as imports,  the move  to free trade in the developing  world con- 
tributes to the growth of developing  country exports  to the high-wage 
nations. 
Finally, there is scattered but suggestive  evidence  that removing for- 
mal barriers to trade is not enough to produce full economic  integration. 
An intriguing study by John McCallum of the Royal Bank of Canada, 
using data from the 1988 input-output tables for Canada, finds that Cana- 
dian provinces traded far more with each other than they did with Amer- 
ican  states  of  comparable  population  and  at  comparable. distances.6 
Thus Ontario exported more than three times as much to British Colum- 
bia, with three million people,  as it did to California, with almost thirty 
million. When McCallum estimated  a gravity equation (see  below)  for 
trade among Canadian provinces  and U.S.  states,  he found that intra- 
Canadian trade was  a startling twenty  times  as  large as  would  have 
otherwise  been expected.  What is so dramatic about these  findings is 
that, although the data predate the Canada-United  States  Free Trade 
Agreement, tariff barriers were already very low in 1988; and the linguis- 
tic divide in North America runs through the middle of Canada, not be- 
tween  Canada and America.  Thus this evidence  suggests  that political 
boundaries,  even  between  friendly  nations  that  speak  the  same  lan- 
guage, can be serious obstacles  to trade. And it therefore helps to con- 
firm the belief, which underlies such initiatives as "1992" in Europe, that 
there remains substantial room for policy moves to expand international 
trade through a process of harmonization of laws and institutions.  (Rob- 
ert Lawrence has dubbed such moves  "deep integration.") 
Boundary Issues 
McCallum's  results  on intra- versus  extra-Canadian trade notwith- 
standing, it is sometimes  useful to think about world trade by imagining 
that it were possible  to take a given geography of world production and 
transportation and then draw arbitrary lines on the map called national 
borders without affecting the underlying economic  geography.  If inter- 
national trade only includes shipments that cross the borders, it is clear 
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that the volume of that trade will depend quite a lot on where one draws 
the lines. 
A case in point is the trade of European Union countries. Taken indi- 
vidually, they are very open economies,  with an average trade share of 
28.0 percent in 1990. However,  more than 60 percent of their merchan- 
dise trade is with each other. If the European Union is taken as a unit, 
its merchandise trade with the external world is only 9 percent of GDP, 
not much more than that of the United States.7 
There has been a fair amount of literal redrawing of boundaries in the 
last few years.  More important for world trade, however,  has been the 
changing distribution of world output among existing  nations.  To  see 
why this matters, compare the likely  share of trade in world output in 
two hypothetical  cases:  a world of two equal-size  countries,  and one in 
which the larger country has 95 percent of gross world product. It seems 
obvious that in the latter case the trade share would be much smaller. 
This idea can be formalized if we suppose that world trade can be de- 
scribed by a simple gravity  equation.  Gravity equations  attempt, with 
considerable  success,  to explain the volume  of trade between  any pair 
of countries with a few variables, usually the GDPs of the countries and 
the distance between them. A typical gravity equation is of the form 
(1)  Tij  =  kIYYjPD1jy, 
where  Tij is the trade between  two countries,  i and j;  Yi  and Yj  are the 
GDP of countries  i and j,  respectively;  Di  is the distance  between  the 
two countries; and k is a parameter. In practice such equations typically 
find the exponents  on GDP to be less than one, and a surprisingly strong 
effect of distance.8 But in an idealized world in which a buyer is equally 
likely, when buying a traded good, to buy it from a supplier anywhere in 
the world, a( = B =  1, and -y = 0. And then two results follow. The share 
of trade in the GDP of any one country would be 
(2)  Ti=  k(1 -si), 
yi 
where si is that country's  share in gross world product; and the share of 
trade in that gross world product would be 
7.  There are no reliable estimates of the direction of service exports.  OECD (1992) has 
data on trade shares. Data on merchandise trade by location from European Economy. 
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(3)  Tw =  k(1 -  Si2). 
Yw 
In other words,  an individual country's  trade would  be larger, the 
smaller its share of world income; and the overall share of trade in the 
world would be larger, the more equal in size its national economies.  In 
actual fact, the national distribution of gross product among the world's 
economies,  as measured at nominal exchange  rates, has become  some- 
what more equal over time: the sum of squared shares fell from 0.130 
in 1960 to 0.104 in 1993. Or, inverting the ratio, the number of country- 
equivalents  in the world economy  has risen from 7.7 to 9.6.  The most 
important source of this rise has been the relative decline of the United 
States,  from 31.6 percent of the gross product of market economies  in 
1970, to 25.6 percent in 1993.9  This may well explain why the rise in the 
trade share has been more dramatic for the United States than for other 
industrial countries: indeed, comparing the present situation with that in 
the 1950s, it may be said that the United States used to trade with a world 
that in economic  terms was barely larger than itself, but now trades with 
a world three times its size. 
Technological  Change 
It is clear that the volume of world trade is not completely determined 
by  technology:  transportation  and  communication  technology  were 
considerably better in 1950 than they were in 1913, but the world econ- 
omy was substantially less integrated. Correspondingly,  since much of 
the growth of trade since then represents only a return to 1913 levels  of 
integration, it is hard to argue that technology  has been the dominant 
factor in that growth. Indeed, it is possible to make a strong antitechnol- 
ogy case: Granted that there have been reductions in transport cost and 
improvements  in the speed  and bandwidth of communications,  surely 
these are marginal improvements  on a set of technologies  that already 
permitted massive long-range trade?  '0 
9.  United Nations (1993). 
10.  It is worth pointing out, however,  that transportation technology  in 1995 should 
not be compared with that in 1950, but rather with the technology  of  1913. Presumably 
there was a rise in potential trade during the interwar period, which was suppressed  by 
political factors and could  only  manifest itself once  a liberal trade regime was  reestab- 
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The case for the important role of technology  must rest on more sub- 
tle indicators than the aggregate volume  of trade. One indicator is the 
emergence of new aspects of trade, especially  those associated  with the 
thinner  slicing  of  the  value  chain.  Arguably,  before  the  widespread 
availability of computers and telecommunications,  the geographic dis- 
persion of a complex  production process  was too  hard to coordinate. 
(Even now, the adoption ofjust-in-time production techniques is usually 
associated  with geographic clustering of production.) 
Some support for this view is given,  in an indirect way, by estimated 
gravity  equations.  These  always  show  a strong effect  of  distance  on 
trade volumes,  which is both too large and of the wrong form to be easily 
associated  with measured transport costs.  While it is not clear why dis- 
tance plays so strong a role in trade, a common guess  is that it proxies 
for the possibilities  of personal contact between  managers, customers, 
and so on; that much business  depends on the ability to exchange  more 
information, of a less formal kind, than can be sent over a wire. If this is 
true, then we might argue that the advent of such innovations  as long- 
range passenger jets,  cheap  intercontinental  telephone  calls,  fax  ma- 
chines, and electronic mail permit an intensity of long-distance business 
relationships that was not possible  in 1913. Steamships  may have been 
quite efficient at transporting bulk commodities,  but they were too slow 
to allow regular visits to headquarters; telegraphs may have allowed ef- 
fectively  instantaneous  communication  of futures prices  and interest 
rates, but they lacked the bandwidth to allow the home office to transmit 
detailed production specifications  and the factory to explain why they 
would not work. 
A final point. There is one aspect of technological  progress that has 
acted to reduce  the share of trade in world output: the faster rate of pro- 
ductivity growth in the production of goods  than that in services.  The 
declining relative productivity of the service sector is, according to most 
estimates,  the main reason why that sector constitutes  a growing share 
of the ermoloyment  and value added in advanced economies  (that is, the 
elasticity of substitution between  services and goods appears to be low, 
so a rising relative price translates into a rising share in the economy). "  I 
Despite  some recent growth in service  trade, services  are by and large 
still nontradable.  Thus although it has become  easier  and cheaper  to 
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trade whatever can be traded, a declining share of the economy  consists 
of tradable goods and services. 
A Stylized  Model  of Global  Trade,  Employment,  and Wages 
So far this paper has described  the growth of world trade and re- 
viewed  some possible  explanations  for that growth. The time has now 
come to try to understand the effects of growing trade-bearing  in mind 
that trade flows  cannot  be  taken  as  wholly  exogenous,  but must  be 
viewed  as part of a system in which they, along with a number of other 
things, are jointly determined. 
What effects  of growing trade should be the subject of analysis? It is 
a bad idea to try to discuss everything that might occur because of inter- 
national integration, all at once. A broad-brush approach may be accept- 
able when offering a descriptive survey, but to assess  the effects of trade 
one needs to create a model; and if the model is to be tractable and com- 
prehensible,  it must focus on only a few things. 
The focus  here will be dictated by political controversy.  Of the new 
aspects of world trade discussed  above, the rise of intra-trade has gener- 
ally been viewed as benign, and the slicing up of the value chain and the 
emergence  of supertrading nations have excited  interest but little con- 
troversy.  The controversial new aspect of international trade is the rise 
of manufacturing exports from newly industrializing economies. 
The rapid growth of NIE  exports  has more or less  coincided  with 
some disturbing trends in OECD labor markets: a sharp rise in wage in- 
equality (especially  in the United States) and a sharp rise in unemploy- 
ment (mainly in Europe). It is widely believed that the unfavorable labor 
market trends and the growth of NIE trade are connected. 
This belief has been expressed  at greatly varying levels of sophistica- 
tion. At one  end,  there is the phenomenon  of a self-made  billionaire- 
turned-politician, who has declared himself an expert on economics  and 
launched a campaign to warn his countrymen  of the impoverishment 
they face  as a result of free  trade with low-wage  nations.  I refer, of 
course, to Sir James Goldsmith, whose book The Trap has been a Euro- 
pean best-seller.  While one  might dismiss  Sir James  and his untitled 
Texan counterpart as marginal, milder versions of the same warning are 
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pean Commission,  in its  1993 White Paper Growth, Competitiveness, 
Employment, attributed a major share of the rise in European unemploy- 
ment rates to the fact that "other countries are becoming industrialized 
and competing with us-even  on our own markets-at  cost levels which 
we simply cannot match."'2 
Academic research has been far less supportive of the claim that NIE 
manufactures exports  are a major source  of problems  in OECD labor 
markets. While there are some studies that do claim to find evidence  for 
substantial pressure  from low-wage  imports on unskilled  labor in ad- 
vanced countries,  it is probably fair to say that a preponderance of the 
research to date suggests that the impact of third world exports on first 
world labor markets has been small, or at least elusive. 13 
One thing that is conspicuously  lacking in the literature to date, how- 
ever, is a consistent  picture of the interaction between labor market de- 
velopments  in the high-wage countries and the growth of exports from 
the low-wage  countries.  While some (though not all) of the studies are 
based on a consistent underlying model of employment and wages in the 
advanced  countries,  there does  not seem to be any effort to show how 
wages  and employment  in the advanced  countries,  and trade with the 
third world might be simultaneously  determined.  That is, there do not 
seem to be any complete general-equilibrium stories out there. 
In the remainder of this paper I will try to fill that gap, by developing 
a highly stylized  model of global trade, employment,  and wages.  This 
model simplifies reality too much to be estimated with or even calibrated 
to the data. It is possible,  however,  to use the results of other peoples' 
empirical  work  to  assign  a set  of  ballpark parameters  to  the  model, 
allowing what amount to glorified back-of-the-envelope  estimates of the 
impact of growing NIE trade. 
Structure of the Model 
In order to focus on the effects  of NIE trade in manufactured goods, 
I assume a world consisting of only two economies:  one that is intended 
to represent the OECD as a whole,  the other to represent the aggregate 
12.  Commission of the European Communities (1993, p.4). 
13.  See,  in particular, Wood (1994) and Leamer (1993, 1994) in support of the adverse 
effects  of NIE  exports,  and Katz  (1992), Bhagwati  and Kosters  (1994), and Sachs  and 
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of NIEs.  All transactions within each aggregate are ignored, as is the ex- 
istence of other types of countries,  like oil exporters. 
The aggregate OECD is assumed to produce and consume two goods, 
1 and 2, with production of good  1 being skill-intensive.  Demand is de- 
termined by a utility function in the consumption of goods  1 and 2, 
(4)  U  =  U(CI,C2)- 
It will be convenient  to assume that tastes are homothetic,  so that mar- 
ginal and average spending have the same composition. 
Since the focus  of this analysis  is on labor market developments  in 
the OECD, it is necessary  to have some explicit treatment of the factor 
markets.  I will make  several  strategic  simplifications.  First,  the only 
productive inputs will be skilled labor (Ls) and unskilled labor (Lu); capi- 
tal will be left out of the story. The main reason for doing this is that the 
distribution of income between  capital and labor has neither changed a 
lot nor been a major source of controversy  in the last two decades;  the 
share of labor compensation  in U.S.  national income,  for example,  has 
barely changed, actually rising from 73 to 74 percent between  1973 and 
1993. It is not clear that this is what one would have expected  a priori, 
nor is it clear that capital will remain a sort of bystander factor indefi- 
nitely.  For the purposes  of this model,  however,  all income will be as- 
sumed to accrue either to skilled or to unskilled labor. 
Second,  production,  Q, will be assumed to take place under constant 
returns to scale, with the production functions 
(5)  Q,=  F(Ls,,  LuI) 
and 
(6)  Q2  =  G(LS2,  LU2) 
Economies  of scale are widely believed to be important in understanding 
both the causes and effects of trade within the OECD, but probably play 
a smaller role in NIE trade. 
For the same reason,  markets are assumed  to be perfectly  competi- 
tive. This is likely to raise some stronger objections.  One common story 
about the effects of international trade on wages is that it has weakened 
the bargaining power of workers; this only makes sense  if workers and 
employers are struggling over the division of some rent, presumably cre- 
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can be a large part of the picture: they seem to predict a shift in the distri- 
bution of income  between  capital and labor, which has not happened, 
rather than between  different types of labor, which has; and they apply 
only to those workers in traded-goods industries, whereas the rise in in- 
come  inequality  has been  pervasive  throughout the economy.  In any 
case, for this model competition is assumed to be perfect. 
The OECD's  trade is the difference  between  its production and its 
consumption.  Exports of the skill-intensive good, X,, and imports of the 
less skill-intensive good, M2, can be written as 
(7)  XI =  ,  C, 
and 
(8)  M2=  C2-Q,2 
How should the OECD's trade with the NIEs be modeled? It is common 
in trade theory  to  work  with  small economies  that face  given  world 
prices; and some writers on the effects  of changing world trade still use 
this assumption.  For the OECD as a whole,  however,  this is a deeply 
unrealistic assumption; worse yet, it is analytically awkward, leading to 
excessively  "bang-bang" solutions in some cases.  It thus makes sense to 
regard the OECD  as having  substantial  market power  relative  to the 
NIEs.  This can be represented by assuming that the OECD faces a rest- 
of-world offer curve, 
(9)  M2=  T(X1). 
I will not make any attempt to model the inside workings of the newly 
industrializing countries;  they will simply be summarized by the offer 
curve given by equation 9. The growth and increased integration of the 
NIEs with the world economy  are then captured simply by an outward 
shift in that offer curve. In fact, since their manufactured exports were 
negligible in 1970, the effects  of their emergence  can be approximated 
by contrasting an initial period in which the OECD has no external trade 
with a subsequent  period in which it faces  an offer curve that leads to 
the observed  trade volumes.  That is, the model analyzes  the effects  of 
globalization by contrasting the current situation with one of autarky for 
the OECD as a whole. 
That is the whole theoretical model. Before assigning ballpark param- 
eter values, it may be useful to review some of the key mechanics of 2 x 2 
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Figure 1.  Relationship between Goods Prices, Factor Prices, and Factor Proportions 
WS/WU 
2 
P I/P2  LSILU 
Source:  Samuelson  (1949). 
The most important relationships are presented in figure 1, which re- 
produces the familiar diagram introduced by Paul Samuelson. 14 Figure 
1 summarizes the three-way  relationship between  goods  prices,  factor 
prices, and factor proportions. The right panel shows that given the ratio 
of skilled to unskilled wages (WslWu), each industry chooses  a ratio of 
skilled to unskilled workers in production. The left panel shows the ba- 
sic  Stolper-Samuelson  relationship  between  the  relative  price  of  the 
skill-intensive good (P/IP2) and the relative wage of skilled workers that 
prevails if both goods are produced. 
Putting  Numbers  to the Model 
Quantifying  a model  like  this  poses  certain  conceptual  problems. 
That is a polite way of saying that it is somewhat difficult to know exactly 
how to assign numbers to a model that is,  in important respects,  bla- 
tantly untrue. Not only are there more than two kinds of labor, other fac- 
tors besides  labor, other regions besides  the OECD and the NIEs;  it is 
not even true that workers of apparently similar skill receive  the same 
wages in exporting and import-competing sectors.  Yet for the model to 
be used,  it is necessary  to assign a set of parameter values  that fit to- 
gether. 
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The following parameters are used in the trade model of the next two 
sections: 
Initial ratio of skilled to unskilled wages  2 
Share of skilled workers in industry 1 employment  0.5 
Share of skilled workers in industry 2 employment  0.2 
Share of skilled workers in labor force  0.4 
Share of wages of skilled workers in industry  2/3 
1 value added 
Share of wages of skilled workers in industry  1/3 
2 value added 
Share of good  1 in total expenditure  5/7 
-Wage  ratio. Adrian Wood, using his definitions, finds a wage ratio 
between skilled and unskilled workers in the North of 2.08.15  I round this 
to 2. 
-Employment  share in industry 1. Wood also estimates  a share of 
skilled employment in export-oriented  manufacturing of 50.24 percent, 
which I round to 50.16 
-Employment  share in industry 2. Wood does  not, for reasons  ex- 
plained below,  estimate  the employment  composition  of Northern im- 
port-competing  production.  Other sources,  using different definitions, 
have produced estimates.  However,  in order to make the model inter- 
nally consistent,  one must meet a constraint that is not met in the actual 
data: the difference in average wages between  export and import-com- 
peting industries must be fully accounted  for by the difference  in skill 
composition.  Bela Balassa found that wages in U.S.  industries that ex- 
port to developing countries were 28 percent higher than those in indus- 
tries competing with imports from those countries; by assigning the im- 
port-competing industry a 20 percent skill fraction, I get an implied 25 
percent average wage ratio, which seems close enough. 17 
-Labor  supplies.  If the OECD is producing both goods,  the ratio of 
skilled to unskilled workers in the labor force must be between the ratios 
in the two industries. The choice  of 40 percent skilled workers is arbi- 
trary, but has little effect on the results below. 
15.  Wood (1994, p.403). 
16.  Wood (1994, p.403). 
17.  Balassa (1979). Paul Krugman  349 
-Remaining  entries.  These  follow  from the previous  numbers.  In 
particular, the share of industry  1 in expenditure  is determined by the 
requirement that the derived demand for factors equal the supply. 
This completes  the stylized  model  of the interaction  between  NIE 
trade and OECD labor markets, together with some semirealistic  num- 
bers that will allow back-of-the-envelope  estimates of effects.  The next 
step  is  to  apply  the  model  under two  alternative  assumptions  about 
OECD labor markets. 
The Impact  of Low-Wage  Exports:  A "European"  Approach 
Most analyses  of the impact of NIE  trade have had an "American" 
flavor, in at least two senses.  First, they tend to be based on U.S.  data. 
Second,  to the extent  that they try to make an explicit  estimate of the 
labor market effects,  they assume  that relative wages  are flexible,  and 
thus that any adverse impact on unskilled workers is reflected in declin- 
ing wages rather than increased unemployment.  This is a reasonable as- 
sumption for the United States,  where low real minimum wages,  weak 
unions,  and a very weak social safety net give real wages for unskilled 
workers an impressive ability to decline.  The European economy,  how- 
ever, which is roughly comparable to that of America in output and em- 
ployment,  presents a very different picture. Wage inequality has not in- 
creased  to anything like the  same  extent;  meanwhile,  unemployment 
has risen from less than 3 percent at the beginning of the 1970s to double 
digits today. 
This in itself would suggest that it is worthwhile to look at the impact 
of integration under "European" assumptions,  with relative wages rigid 
and the consequent  reduced demand for less skilled workers reflected in 
unemployment. In addition, however,  the European version of the story 
is revealing in other ways: it highlights the importance of a general-equi- 
librium approach, and (as the next section  shows)  there are some  sur- 
prising quantitative contrasts between the effects of trade in a "Europe- 
anized" and an "Americanized" model. 
For the moment, then, assume that ws / wu is fixed, so that any pres- 
sure on labor demand is reflected in employment rather than wages; and 
suppose  that a previously  autarkic OECD economy  is now presented 
with an offer curve  from a group of newly  industrialized  economies, 
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Figure 2.  Adjustment of OECD Employment under the "European" Model 
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Source:  Author's  model as described  in text. 
The consequences  may be analyzed in stages.'8  First, note that with 
rigid relative  wages,  the  skilled-to-unskilled  ratio in each  industry  is 
fixed. These ratios are illustrated by the slopes  of rays 1 and 2 in figure 
2, which shows employment in the economy.  The point E represents the 
initial employment of the two factors.  Since these levels of employment 
must be achieved using the factor proportions implied by the fixed rela- 
tive wage, the resources  employed in each industry are indicated by Q1 
and Q2. Now  suppose  that there is a fall in the relative demand for the 
less  skill-intensive  good.  This  cannot  be  met by a change  in relative 
wages,  so it must be met with a reduction in unskilled employment.  The 
employment  point moves  left to E'.  And output obeys  the Rybczynski 
theorem: the resources devoted to industry 2 fall to Q2', while those de- 
voted to industry 1 actually rise, to Q1t. 
Next,  consider the implications for international trade. Figure 3 plots 
OECD exports against imports. Point 0  represents autarky (no trade in 
manufactures with the NIEs),  and slope  of the ray OA represents  the 
relative price of good  1 in autarky. Now  the NIEs  arrive on the scene, 
with their presence summarized by the offer curve OC. What effect does 
this have on relative prices? As long as the OECD continues to produce 
18.  This analysis was inspired by and closely  follows the analysis in Brecher (1974). Paul Kriugman  351 
Figure 3.  Adjustment of OECD Exports and Imports under the "European" Model 
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Source:  Author's  model as described  in text. 
both goods,  it has no effect: the fixed relative wage ties down the rela- 
tive price, according to the relationship in the left panel of figure 1. So 
the NIEs  simply move  along their offer curve to the point T, with OT 
representing the volume of trade. 
How does the emergence  of this trade affect the OECD economy?  It 
must be  accommodated  by  changes  in both  production  and employ- 
ment, changes that involve demand as well as supply and even a sort of 
multiplier effect.  The  somewhat  surprising logic  of this response  has 
not, to my knowledge,  been traced out before; it is illustrated in figure 4. 
In this figure, the curve represents the production possibilities  of the 
aggregated OECD economy,  given the initial employment  of both fac- 
tors. The point A is the equilibrium consumption  and production of the 
economy  in autarky-that  is, before the NIEs arrive on the scene.  Con- 
sumption  at the  relative  prices  indicated  by  the  tangent  budget  line 
through A will depend  on income;  the ray OA represents  the income 
expansion path. 
Now the OECD opens trade with NIE economies  that export good 2 
and import good 1. If the OECD were a small, price-taking economy,  it 
would completely  cease  production of good 2. But because  it is not, its 
production of 2 falls and its production of 1 rises, with an unchanged rel- 
ative price, until the desired trade equals the amount of trade that the 352  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
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Source:  Author's  model as described  in text. 
NIEs are willing to do at that given relative price. Figure 4 shows that as 
employment  of unskilled workers falls, the OECD's  production moves 
down the "Rybczynski  line" AR,  which corresponds  to the kind of ad- 
justment in production shown in figure 2. The value of production falls, 
and  therefore  the  budget  line  shifts  in;  consumption  therefore  also 
moves  down along the expansion  path OA.  Global trade equilibrium is 
reached when the OECD's  desired trade vector  CQ is just equal to the 
NIE desired trade vector OT in figure 3. 
The opening of trade with the third world, then-given  the assump- 
tion of rigid relative wages-leads  to a fall in OECD employment.  But 
how much of a fall? And how would one estimate the employment reduc- 
tion in practice? 
Interestingly,  two  popular calculations  actually understate  the em- 
ployment effects  of trade. One calculation involves  looking at the total 
employment  embodied in exports and imports. Since the average wage 
in export industries is, in fact, higher than that in import-competing in- 
dustries, this approach seems to indicate that the number ofjobs  created Paul Krugman  353 
Figure 5.  Adjustment of OECD Employment and Consumption under the "European" 
Model 
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Source:  Author's  model as described  in text. 
by exports falls short of those displaced by imports. The other popular 
calculation involves  looking only at the unskilled labor embodied in ex- 
ports and imports, since it is among the unskilled that employment falls. 
Both of these  approaches,  however,  miss the point that as employ- 
ment falls, so does income and hence domestic demand. It is clear from 
figure 4 that the output of good 1 rises by less than the volume of exports, 
and that the output of good 2 falls by more than the volume of imports. 
How,  then, can the employment  effects of trade be determined? One 
way is to calculate  the new equilibrium and grind out the implied em- 
ployment change. There is, however,  a shortcut that is possible because 
there is no change in relative wages  (by assumption) or relative prices 
(by implication). That approach is illustrated in figure 5. As in figure 2, 
we  show  the factor content  of output,  with A the initial employment. 
Figure 5, however,  also shows OECD demand-the  derived demand for 
factors embodied in production. In autarky this must be equal to the to- 
tal  supply.  As  income  falls,  this  derived  demand  will  fall  along  the 
expansion path OA. Meanwhile,  employment  of unskilled workers will 
fall to a point such as E. Through E,  I have drawn a budget line, EC, 
whose slope is equal to ws / wu; employment and consumption of factors 354  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1995 
must both lie on such a line. Equilibrium involves  a situation in which 
the production point, E, and the consumption point, C, are such that the 
implied trade in embodied  factors,  EC,  equals the difference  between 
the factors used to produce exports and those that would be needed to 
replace imports. 19 
It is immediately apparent that the decline in employment of unskilled 
labor is greater than the quantity of labor embodied  in trade. The net 
"import"of unskilled labor is the distance ED, but the actual fall in em- 
ployment is measured by the full distance EA. 
The Employment Effects  of NIE Exports 
As figure 5 indicates,  the effects  of trade on employment  in a rigid- 
wage economy  may be estimated  from the factor content  of trade, to- 
gether with an estimate of the general-equilibrium multiplier effect.  Spe- 
cifically, the fall in employment is 
Net imports of unskilled labor +  (Net exports of skilled labor 
x  Unskilled-to-skilled ratio in OECD economy) 
Table 5 shows the results, using the World Bank's latest estimate of 
the share of NIE manufactures exports in OECD gross product and the 
parameters listed above. 
This is a fairly large effect.  It is still only a fraction of the actual rise 
in European unemployment,  but it is far from negligible. And it therefore 
seems  to  suggest  considerable  reason  for concern  over  the effects  of 
low-wage manufactures exports on first world labor markets. 
This fairly large estimate depends, however,  on the assumption of rig- 
idly fixed relative wages.  Even in Europe,  this is an exaggeration; and 
relative wages appear to be highly flexible in the United States. How do 
19.  The relevant factor content of trade here is that in OECD import-substituting pro- 
duction; the factors  used to produce the goods  in the third world are irrelevant. Wood 
(1994) has argued that developing  countries  produce "noncompeting goods" that are no 
longer produced in the high-wage nations, and that one must therefore try to estimate what 
it would have taken to produce these goods,  rather than look at actual OECD industries. 
This assertion is, however,  problematic. If these really are noncompeting goods,  how can 
one assess their impact without specifying how they substitute in demand for other goods? 
After all, in a two-good  model in which the OECD and the NIEs  are specialized  in pro- 
ducing different goods,  an expansion of NIE exports would have no effect at all on equilib- 
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Table 5.  Employment Effects of Trade under "European" Assumption 
Units as indicated 
Manufactures importsa  1.75 
Net  imports of unskilled laborb  0.82 
Net  exports  of skilled laborb  0.41 
Unskilled-to-skilled  ratio in aggregate  1.5 
employment 
Fall in employmentc  1.43 
Source:  Author's  calculations  based on model described  in text  and World Bank (1995). 
a.  Percentage  of GDP. 
b.  Percentage  of total employment. 
c.  Percent. 
the results change if we "Americanize" the model, allowing wages to be 
flexible and therefore assuming that the effects  of trade manifest them- 
selves  in income inequality rather than unemployment? 
The Impact  of Low-Wage  Exports:  An "American"  Model 
With full employment  of both skilled and unskilled labor maintained 
by wage flexibility, the effects  of opening trade between the OECD and 
the NIEs  can be represented by a figure so familiar that Ronald Findlay 
has  dubbed  it the  "sacred  diagram" of  international  trade.  Figure  6 
shows how the pieces fit together when relative wages and hence prices 
can change. Point A, once again, represents OECD autarky. When trade 
is opened,  the relative price of good 1 rises; the result is that production 
moves  to Q, while consumption  moves  to C. If this is a global equilib- 
rium, the NIE offer curve-drawn  backward, with its origin at Q-must 
also pass through C, so that desired OECD exports equal desired NIE 
imports, and vice versa. 
But how  can we  quantify this qualitative picture? At first, it might 
seem possible to begin in the same way as in the rigid-wage case, by cal- 
culating the factor content of trade; then asking how much these changes 
in effective  supplies of skilled and unskilled labor affect relative wages, 
by making use of some estimated  elasticity  of substitution.  This has in 
fact been the approach taken by some studies.20 Unfortunately,  it runs 
into serious conceptual difficulties. Even the concept of net trade in em- 
20.  See, in particular, Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1991). 356  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 






Source:  Author's  model as described  in text. 
bodied  services  become  hard to  make  sense  of  when  relative  factor 
prices change as a result of trade; and the elasticity  of substitution be- 
tween  skilled  and  unskilled  labor  will  change  when  an  economy  is 
opened, if it has any meaning at all. (It is possible  to rescue the concept 
if the economy  does not face given world prices, but rather faces a con- 
cave foreign offer curve-and  this is certainly true for the OECD as a 
whole. So one should not be as harsh in condemning studies that attempt 
to make inferences from the factor content of trade as some critics, such 
as Leamer, have been.21) 
Given these  conceptual  difficulties,  several  recent  studies  have  at- 
tempted to  infer the effects  of  trade on  relative  wages  by looking  at 
pieces of the mechanism by which the process  should work. In particu- 
lar, Robert Lawrence  and Matthew Slaughter looked for evidence  that 
the relative prices of less  skill-intensive  goods  have indeed fallen,  and 
that the industry mix within the United States has shifted toward skill- 
21.  SeeLeamer(1994). Paul Krugmnan  357 
intensive  sectors.22 They could not find any. A follow-up  paper by Jef- 
frey Sachs and Howard Schatz did find some weak evidence  for relative 
price changes in the expected  direction, but nothing compelling.23 
I offer here an alternative approach: with the addition of some further 
assumptions to the model already described, it turns into a tiny, comput- 
able general-equilibrium model of world trade. I can then ask the follow- 
ing question:  What changes  in relative wages and prices would be con- 
sistent  with the observed growth of trade? The answer turns out to be 
surprisingly small-that  is, the same model that predicts fairly large em- 
ployment effects with rigid wages predicts quite small effects on relative 
wages when they are flexible. 
Making the Model  Computable 
In order to make the model computable in the face of flexible prices 
and wages,  it is necessary  to specify  elasticities  of substitution in pro- 
duction and consumption-in  effect,  to choose  functional forms. Since 
this is an illustrative exercise  rather than a full-fledged CGE modeling 
project, it is sufficient to go with the simplest case (which is not too far 
from most empirical estimates)  of unitary elasticity.  That is, the model 
will be made Cobb-Douglas throughout. 
In stating the model,  it is also convenient  to make some simplifying 
choices of units. Letting unskilled labor be the numeraire, I choose  units 
so that in autarky the prices of both goods are one. I also measure skilled 
labor in units of half a worker-a  trick normalization that implies an au- 
tarky relative wage that is also one. To be consistent with this normaliza- 
tion, the economy's  endowment  is assumed  to consist  of sixty units of 
unskilled and eighty revised units of skilled labor. 
Given these choices  of units, and the parameter values listed above, 
output and factor markets in the OECD can be represented by the fol- 
lowing equations: 
First, letting w be the relative wage of skilled labor (one in autarky) 
gives  expressions  for average  cost-which  must  equal prices  if both 
goods are produced in the OECD. 
(10)  P1  =  w2/3,  P2  =  W-/3 
22.  Lawrence and Slaughter (1993). 
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Next,  expressions  for the unit input choices for both factors in both sec- 
tors may be written 
(1 1)  a=  -  =  I  w  w2'3, aS2  =w  -2'3,  au2 
=  --w1/3 
3  ul  3  ~~3  32 
Given these input coefficients,  output is determined by the requirement 
of full employment of both factors. These conditions may be written 
(12)  Ls =  asiQi  +  aS2 Q2  L  =  auIQI  +  aU2Q2, 
which yield the output equations 
(13)  QI =  D1[aU2Ls  -  aS2Lu],  Q2 =  D-[-au,Ls  +  as,Lu], 
where 
(14)  D  =  aS  aU2  -aS2aul 
Given the output and prices of the two goods,  it is straightforward to 
calculate  the implied trade vector.  In fact,  the relevant number is the 
share of OECD-NIE trade in OECD output; this is simply the difference 
between the share of good 1 in output and in consumption: 
(15)  T  P1Q1  4 
(15)  ~~~~~PIQI  +  P2Q2  7- 
Equations 10-15, then, lead from an assumed relative wage to the im- 
plied relative  prices  and share of  trade in output.  It is also  possible, 
therefore, to reverse the procedure, and ask how large a change in rela- 
tive wages in the OECD might be associated  with the emergence of NIE 
trade on the scale  actually  seen.  And the answer is that trade on this 
scale should be associated  with a fairly small wage change-and  a very 
small change in relative prices. 
Table 6 shows the implications of a 3 percent rise in the relative wage 
of skilled workers from its autarky level.  It turns out that this is large 
enough to imply NIE trade of 2.2 percent of OECD gross product; which 
is more than the actual share of NIE manufactures in OECD spending. 
Yet this wage rise would be associated  with a rise of only  1 percent in 
the relative price of skill-intensive  goods.  Admittedly,  this exercise  is 
carried out not only with a highly stylized model, but also on the assump- 
tion of unitary elasticities  of substitution  in production and consump- 
tion.  If these  elasticities  were  lower,  the  implied  change  in relative Paul Krugman  359 
Table 6.  Implications of a 3 Percent Rise in Relative Wages of Skilled Workers 
Percent 
Share of NIE  exports  in OECD output  2.2 
Change in relative  price of good  1  1.0 
Change in output of good  1  2.8 
Change in output of good  2  -6.9 
Change in real wages  of unskilled  workers  -  1.7 
Source:  Author's  calculations  based on model described  in text. 
wages would be larger. Nonetheless,  the exercise  helps to explain why 
studies that attempt to infer the effects  of trade on income distribution 
by looking at prices have failed to find any clear-cut effects: for plausible 
parameter  values,  the  change  in  relative  prices  associated  with  the 
growth of NIE trade should be well within measurement error. 
The Limits to Factor  Price Equalization 
Some of those who worry about the effects of NIE exports on OECD 
labor markets might accept that these  effects  have been fairly small so 
far; but they would argue that these effects will become  much larger, as 
industrialization spreads. It is possible  to make a counterargument: As 
newly industrializing countries grow, their comparative advantage may 
shift away from products of very low skill intensity. Is it really likely that 
skilled labor will be a scarcer commodity  in the world economy  twenty 
years from now than it is today? But it is worth asking how large the po- 
tential effects  of trade on OECD income inequality could be in a sort of 
worst case scenario. 
An extreme view would be that growing international trade will lead 
to full factor price equalization: that wages for unskilled labor in OECD 
countries will be driven down toward their average levels  in the world 
as a whole. Indeed, it might seem that this is precisely what conventional 
trade theory would predict: in the absence of any barriers to trade, isn't 
trade a substitute for factor mobility? 
This extreme view,  however,  neglects  an important limitation to the 
factor price equalization theorem: it only works as long as a country re- 
mains nonspecialized.  If the change in relative prices is so large that the 
OECD no longer produces  goods  that compete  with low-skill  imports, 
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effect on income distribution. (This is why Wood's  insistence  that NIE 
exports are noncompeting  is so puzzling: surely this is exactly  the case 
in which the tendency toward factor price equalization breaks down?24) 
In the context  of my miniature CGE model,  it is straightforward to 
find the limits of factor price equalization.  At a relative wage of skilled 
labor 50 percent above  its autarky level,  and a corresponding  relative 
price of the skill-intensive good 14.5 percent above its original level,  the 
OECD economy  becomes  completely  specialized  in the skill-intensive 
good.  Any further change in the relative price has no effect on relative 
wages. 
Even this case,  however,  seems  unlikely to occur because  it implies 
unreasonably large trade volumes.  At the point of OECD specialization, 
manufactured  imports  from  the  NIEs  would  reach  28.6  percent  of 
OECD gross product! In the context  of this model,  this is possible.  If 
the model were modified to make a reasonable  percentage  (at least 60 
percent) of OECD expenditure fall on nontraded goods and services,  the 
point of complete  specialization in traded goods would be reached after 
a substantially smaller change in income distribution.25 
The flexible-wage version of the model, then, suggests that NIE trade 
can explain only a fraction of the huge increase in income inequality that 
has occurred in the United States since the 1970s.26 And while it shows 
that larger effects from such trade could occur in the future, it also points 
24.  See Wood (1994). 
25.  For example,  adding a nontraded sector that receives  60 percent of expenditures, 
and assuming that this sector initially uses skilled and unskilled labor in the same propor- 
tions as the OECD endowment,  the model says that NIE trade can raise the relative wage 
of skilled labor by at most 17 percent. 
26.  The comparison between the European and the American cases  may seem to sug- 
gest that a little bit of wage flexibility goes a long way,  and to make one wonder whether 
even Eurosclerotic economies  are really unable to adjust relative wages by a few percent. 
It is important to be careful about making too much of this. First, the estimated impact of 
NIE  trade in the European case  amounts to roughly 20 percent of the rise in European 
unemployment  since the early 1970s, while the impact in the American case  amounts to 
roughly 10 percent of the rise in U.S.  wage inequality over the same period; given the num- 
ber of ad hoc assumptions involved,  this is not a major difference.  Second,  one should not 
fall into the fallacy  of imagining that since  any adverse  shock  can be decomposed  into 
many smaller components,  adjustment is always  easy!  (Achilles  can, in fact,  outrun the 
tortoise.) Rising European unemployment is presumably the result of a number of factors. 
Any one of these factors could have been offset by a small change in relative wages; but 
to offset them all would presumably have required something comparable to the massive 
growth in inequality that has occurred in the United States. Paul Krugman  361 
out that there are limits to the change in relative wages that trade flows 
can produce. 
Conclusions 
The expansion of world trade is a topic that inspires hyperbole. Seem- 
ingly sober commentators are easily caught up in a rhetoric that portrays 
the growing integration of markets in recent years as an unprecedented 
event that changes  all the rules for economic  analysis and policy.  And 
many observers,  contemplating  the rapid growth of manufactured ex- 
ports from low-wage  countries,  have sounded ominous warnings about 
the effect of trade on advanced-country  labor markets. 
The truth is considerably  more prosaic. International trade has risen 
substantially since World War II. Much of that growth, however,  simply 
reflects a recovery  to levels  achieved  before World War I. While world 
trade is a larger share of world production than ever before, the United 
States is still considerably  less dependent on trade than most other ad- 
vanced countries were a century ago. 
It is true that there are new aspects  to international trade. Of these, 
the most conspicuous  and also most controversial  is the growth of low- 
wage manufactured exports. This growth almost certainly has had some 
role in the growth both of unemployment in Europe and of wage inequal- 
ity in the United States. A sober assessment  does not, however,  support 
the view that NIE trade is the principal cause of these labor market prob- 
lems; nor does it support apocalyptic predictions about the future effects 
of that trade. 
Perhaps the most important thing to say involves  methodology-how 
to think about the global economy.  One of the disturbing aspects  about 
much of the popular and even the professional discussion  of world trade 
has been  its casualness.  Commentators  talk loosely  of countries  com- 
peting like big corporations,  or of  unskilled  workers  competing  with 
their counterparts in the third world; they rarely ask whether their sto- 
ries  are  logically  consistent,  let  alone  whether  sweeping  assertions 
about the implications  of world trade can be reconciled  with the rela- 
tively modest magnitudes of actual trade flows and price changes. 
There is a way to think systematically  about the effects  of growing 
world trade: it is called general-equilibrium trade theory. Indeed, the hot 362  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
current topic of NIE trade in manufactures is almost tailormade for anal- 
ysis using the techniques  developed  decades  ago by Jagdish Bhagwati, 
T.  N.  Srinivasan,  Ron Jones,  and their students.  These  are textbook 
models whose time has come. Comments 
and Discussion 
Richard N. Cooper:  This is a splendid paper. It is simple, elegant, easy 
to read once you get into the framework of the trade theory that Krug- 
man uses.  It makes a silk purse out of a sow's  ear in the sense of turning 
a highly simplified and abstract teaching  model  into a tool  to provide 
quantitative-not  just qualitative-insight  about the real world. I will of- 
fer two comments on the paper, one relatively brief and one longer. Both 
are empirical in nature. 
The first point concerns  Krugman's view that world trade in the last 
half century, at least until the early 1980s, basically represents a return 
to  1913. I believe  he understates  the extent  to which barriers to trade 
have declined during the whole period. I refer, especially,  to technologi- 
cal improvements in transportation. 
It is true that the steel hull and the screw propeller were known by 
1870, and that they were  really important innovations  in ocean  trans- 
port.  But the average  merchant  ship in  1950 was  between  5,000  and 
10,000 tons, compared with modern ships of 150,000 tons and over, such 
as  supertankers,  bulk  carriers,  container  ships,  and  roll-on-roll-off 
ships. These  large ships have greatly reduced the cost  of ocean  trans- 
port, particularly for low-value items, such that even iron ore and steam 
coal can be shipped economically  for long distances.  Europe can import 
coal from South Africa, Japan from Australia, the United States can im- 
port iron ore from Liberia, and so forth. This kind of trade was not gener- 
ally economical  in 1913. It is true that coal was shipped long distances, 
but that was mainly to coaling stations as fuel for ships, and not for use 
on land. 
Much more  significant than those  developments,  in my  view,  has 
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been the evolution of air freight with the emergence of the long-distance 
jet airliner in 1958 and, especially,  of the wide body jet in 1967. 
It may come  as a surprise, but 29 percent of U.S.  exports by value 
and 21 percent of U.S.  imports traveled by air in 1993. (These figures, of 
course, include trade in aircraft.) These shares have been growing stead- 
ily. If we exclude trade with Canada and Mexico,  much of which is over- 
land, then over 40 percent of U.S.  overseas  exports go by air, and nearly 
30 percent of imports. 
This  represents  a staggering change  in the  modes  of  international 
trade from twenty or thirty years ago. Cut flowers, formerly a local item, 
are now  tradable over  great distances.  Israel is a big exporter  of cut 
flowers to the United  States.  Air freight also permits the international 
organization of production slicing, which Krugman addresses,  and com- 
bines it with just-in-time.  Goods  can leave  Singapore today and arrive 
anywhere in the United States tomorrow. 
Also noteworthy,  as Krugman acknowledges,  is a marked decline in 
the legal barriers to trade since the 1930s. Much of this represents a re- 
turn to 1913; but we have gone way beyond  1913. Tariff levels on indus- 
trial products imported into the industrialized nations are now less than 
10 percent of those in 1947, before the first of the eight GATT rounds of 
multilateral trade negotiations took place. Trade among industrial coun- 
tries, meaning Europe and Japan, was ridden with quantitative restric- 
tions at that time. Those are virtually gone now. 
Those  of us who till the fields of trade policy  wring our hands over 
the multifiber agreement,  antidumping duties,  and current quantitative 
restrictions on agriculture and so-called voluntary export restraints. But 
these are small barriers compared to what existed  in Europe and Japan 
in the  1950s and even  the early  1960s, and in developing  countries,  as 
Krugman points out, as late as the  1980s. The large import liberaliza- 
tions of the last decade  have not just completed  the reductions agreed 
on at the Tokyo Round in 1979. Many developing  countries have made 
unilateral liberalizations beyond these international agreements. 
Let me turn to the second  part of the paper. Although it is quantita- 
tive, it has the great merit of being free of facts.  It is thus not possible to 
quarrel over the quality of Krugman's data, or the statistical significance 
of his econometric  equations, which is the normal practice at Brookings 
Panel meetings. 
This analysis  is quite explicitly  an illustrative exercise.  With Krug- Paul Krugman  365 
man's choice of parameters, which he draws from a combination of the 
professional literature, judgment,  and the requirement for internal con- 
sistency,  and under what he calls the European model,  which assumes 
fixed real wages,  all existing North-South  trade in manufactured goods 
would reduce employment by 1.4 percent in the North. 
The level  of trade that we actually observe  would alter the skilled- 
unskilled wage differiential  by 3 percent under flexible wages and actu- 
ally reduce real wages  of unskilled workers by  1.7 percent,  compared 
with a situation involving no trade. 
Those  are Krugman's  quantitative  findings.  How  do  these  figures 
compare with the growing number of empirical estimates that have been 
developed over recent years, some of them in Brookings Papers on Eco- 
nomic Activity? I report five for comparison. 
George Borjas, Richard Freeman, and Lawrence Katz impute a max- 
imum of 15 percent of the growth in the college-noncollege  wage differ- 
ential over the 1980s to imports. I 
Lawrence and Slaughter, coming at this with the perspective  of trade 
rather than labor economists,  find that trade cannot explain any of the 
growth in wage differentials.  In fact,  based on their assessment  of the 
way  commodity  prices  moved  and the way factor prices  must move, 
they  conclude  that,  if anything,  trade "nudged relative  wages  toward 
greater equality."2 
Sachs and Shatz, also in a Brookings Panel paper, attribute 6.2 per- 
cent of the decline  in unskilled employment  in manufacturing over the 
1980s to imports, on the very  strong assumption  that trade shares are 
frozen at their 1978 levels.3 They criticize  Lawrence  and Slaughter for 
not observing  trends,  yet  they fall into the same error themselves  by 
making this key assumption.  If they permitted a continuation of previ- 
ous trends in import ratios, they would find that imports had a smaller 
effect. 
Wood, who has written an entire book on North-South  trade and its 
impact on labor markets in the North, attributes 5 percent of the decline 
in employment  in manufacturing in the OECD area to imports from de- 
veloping  countries.  He then arbitrarily multiplies that number by four 
1.  Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1992). 
2.  Lawrence and Slaughter (1993). 
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to allow for services,  which he does analyze explicitly,  and for what he 
considers to be important trade-induced innovation,  which on his argu- 
ment will be biased against unskilled labor.4 (In that, I believe he is quite 
wrong.) 
I havejoined  the growing crowd in this cottage industry with a partial- 
equilibrium analysis.5 I am troubled by the common practice of treating 
production workers as unskilled and nonproduction workers as skilled. 
That seems much too coarse an assumption.  I focus instead on the least 
skilled members of the labor force,  measured by the wage profile. This 
criterion directs attention to the textile,  apparel, and leather (TAL) in- 
dustries. I conclude  that 10 percent of the relative decline in the wages 
of unskilled production workers  can be attributed to imports into the 
United States of unskilled-labor-intensive  goods,  that is, TAL goods. 
I apply  the  same  model  to  the  six  largest  European  countries,  of 
which the Netherlands  is the smallest.  Surprisingly, I find that relative 
wage movements,  although less dramatic than in the United States, gen- 
erally have been sufficient to absorb the unskilled labor released by the 
TAL  industries.  The significant exception  is France,  where  the wage 
structure was exceptionally  rigid over the  1980s. That has to do, inter 
alia, with the fact that France has the world's highest minimum wage. 
How do I justify a partial-equilibrium analysis and a focus on the tex- 
tile, apparel, and leather industries? Here,  let me introduce some rele- 
vant facts about the United States (similar facts hold for the European 
countries),  which Krugman's model ignores. 
There were thirteen million production workers in U.S.  manufactur- 
ing in 1990. In the three industries that I focus on, there were 1.9 million. 
The decline in the number of production workers in manufacturing over 
the 1980s amounted to about one million, of which 40 percent were in the 
TAL industries. Thus the bulk of the decline in employment of unskilled 
workers, measured by the wage profile, was in these three industries. 
Those  figures have  to be contrasted  with the twenty-seven  million 
production workers in U.S.  retail trade, restaurants, and hotels in 1990, 
whose  number grew by six million over the decade.  These  include the 
McDonald's  hamburger flippers that we keep hearing about. Again, by 
the wage profile these are the least skilled members of the American la- 
bor force. 
4.  Wood (1994). 
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The key point is that the employment  changes in the tradable manu- 
facturing sector  were  relatively  small against the large scale  and the 
large increase of employment in the nontradable sectors.  I calculate the 
import-induced reduction in employment  in the TAL industries, and in 
the in relative wage movements  needed to absorb those released work- 
ers into the huge nontradable sector,  which has a big demand for un- 
skilled workers.  The  result is the  10 percent  mentioned  earlier.  Like 
Krugman, I expected  to find some unemployment effects in Europe due 
to wage rigidities, but I discovered  that wage flexibility was sufficient, 
except  in France,  to absorb workers released from the TAL industries 
into the retail sector. 
Let me close with some remarks on the intellectual framework behind 
my analysis because  it is rather different from Krugman's. The big dif- 
ferences  are that he discounts  the large nontradable sector,  and also re- 
lies, in a decisive  way, on complete homogeneity  of the traded goods. 
While imported manufactured goods may be good substitutes for do- 
mestic products, they are not completely  homogenous,  and this is an im- 
portant difference.  I find, as Lawrence  and Slaughter do, that the rela- 
tive  (value added) prices  of textiles,  apparel, and leather goods  to all 
manufactured goods rose over the decade of the 1980s. 
How can that happen in the face of stiff import competition?  Import 
competition from developing countries puts indigenous industries under 
competitive  pressure, and they respond in two ways. The first is by con- 
solidating, shedding labor, and perhaps going out of business.  The other 
is by upgrading their product. Firms try to differentiate their products. 
Under these conditions,  it is possible for the price of import goods to fall 
even  while the price of competing  domestic  goods  rises,  because  they 
are for slightly different products that serve  the same function:  men's 
shirts, for example.  On this view,  labor is shed from the tradable sector 
even with flexible wages.  The question then becomes:  How good is the 
economic  system  at absorbing the released  labor with little decline  in 
wages? That is where a large nontradable sector plays a critical role. 
In summary, Krugman's results do a nice job of bounding the impact 
of import competition in the context of classical trade theory and identi- 
fying why the plausible effects  are small. But two elements  of realism 
would  modify  his  model.  First,  because  goods  are nonhomogenous, 
complete  specialization  in similar but differentiated  goods  may occur 
earlier than Krugman allows.  Second,  the existence  of a large nontrada- 368  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
ble sector  limits the impact of competition  from imports on domestic 
wages. 
T. N. Srinivasan:  I enjoyed reading Krugman's paper and, as always, 
was rewarded with penetrating insights and left with envy at his elegant 
and parsimonious modeling. His earlier inveighing against vacuous  no- 
tions  of  competitiveness  and dangerous  practices  of  managed  trade, 
through its cogent reasoning, put all rational individuals in his debt. He 
has now done a great service  by analyzing an issue in which emotions, 
rather than reasoning, have played a major role. 
Richard Cooper, in his masterly way, has surveyed the scene and has 
preempted several of my points.  I will just add one or two with respect 
to the facts relating to trends in international trade. Krugman quotes the 
proportion of trade to GDP, going all the way back to 1850. Anyone who 
has looked  at how trade and GDP data are put together would caution 
against placing too much reliance on these numbers. I Even if they were 
reliable, it would be hard to interpret them.  After all, theory does  not 
indicate  a monotone  relation between  GDP growth and the trade-to- 
GDP ratio. For example,  take the standard Cass-Koopmans  model of 
optimal growth in an economy that is specialized in producing consumer 
goods  and imports investment  goods.  Suppose  there is no population 
growth,  capital  lasts  forever,  and  there  are  no  intercountry  capital 
movements.  Given a positive discount rate, there exists a unique steady 
state in which the investment rate is zero.  As such, imports would also 
be zero.  During the transition to the steady state from an initial capital 
stock that is below its steady state value, there would be investment and 
hence,  imports and a positive trade-to-GDP ratio that converges  to zero 
in steady state along an optimal growth path. Thus in theory it is possible 
for the trade-to-GDP ratio to decline rather than increase as GDP grows. 
As Krugman points out, geographical aggregation matters. Think of 
a two-country  trading world,  with each country  specialized  in its own 
export good,  and importing what it consumes  entirely from the other 
country. The trade-to-GDP ratio would be 200 percent for each country, 
by definition, because exports and imports both equal the value of GDP. 
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Now  if the two countries combine and form a one-country  world, then 
all international trade disappears and the ratio falls from 200 percent to 
0 percent! Krugman also mentions the changing characteristics of inter- 
national trade and draws attention to the increasing importance of intra- 
industry trade. Depending upon geographical and temporal aggregation, 
as well as aggregation over states of nature, published data could mag- 
nify the extent of intra-industry trade. 
I agree with Cooper that it is an exaggeration to suggest, as Krugman 
does,  that all the major technological  innovations  influencing trade are 
those relating to transport and communications,  and that these (namely 
the railroad, the steamship,  and the telegraph) had already taken place 
on the eve  of World War I. Let me give an example  of how a process 
innovation could also enable the slicing up of the value added to which 
Krugman draws attention.  This relates to the steel industry, which fig- 
ures in the beautiful mural by  Diego  Rivera  in Detroit  mentioned  by 
Krugman. In this mural, apparently, at one end there are blast furnaces 
and at the other end automobiles  come out. Now  there is a process  for 
producing steel  using natural gas as a reducing agent instead of coke. 
This process  produces  sponge  iron which,  in turn, is used along with 
steel scrap in electric arc furnaces. 
With this process  there is no need to have a steel plant next to a coal 
mine or an iron ore mine, and there are no significant scale economies. 
The steel  industry became  "footloose"-and  many "mini" steel plants 
of this nature have come up all over the world. Krugman understates the 
importance of such process  innovations,  as well as recent technological 
changes such asjumbojets  for passenger and cargo transport, container- 
ization,  computer and communication  technology,  in the slicing-up of 
value added. 
Krugman is right in emphasizing that massive reductions in trade bar- 
riers since 1913 have contributed to the growth in world trade. However, 
the trend toward increasing  barriers in the post-World  War II era is 
more important than Cooper allows.  He suggests  that the textiles,  ap- 
parel, and leather industries are more relevant than high technology  in- 
dustries for the debate on wage trends in the United States and Europe. 
But these are the very industries in which the barriers grew after the Sec- 
ond World War. The notorious  multifibre arrangement (MFA) did not 
exist prior to 1960. Initially it was a short-term agreement in cotton tex- 
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all fibers known to man and god. Besides,  anytime a country that was not 
under the MFA began exporting a noticeable amount, the industrialized 
countries slapped a quota on it and brought it into the MFA! One should 
not, therefore, understate this tendency for increasing barriers to trade 
when it comes to exports from developing  countries. 
The Uruguay Round agreement will phase out MFA in ten years. The 
agreement also rules out the use of "gray area" measures such as volun- 
tary export restraints, and brings greater transparency and discipline on 
the antidumping and countervailing  duty actions.  One hopes  that the 
agreement will be implemented,  and not violated  or evaded.  Unfortu- 
nately the United States has set a bad example with its recent unilateral 
decision  to double tariffs on selected  Japanese automobiles from levels 
that had earlier been bound under GATT, and by doing so without wait- 
ing for the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organiza- 
tion to decide on its complaint against Japan. 
Before I turn to Krugman's stylized model of global trade, let me say 
that I agree with Leamer' s withering criticism that many of the empirical 
studies,  particularly those by labor economists,  do not apply the stan- 
dard theorems of international trade correctly.2 They do not recognize 
that trade is quintessentially an endogenous phenomenon.  Besides,  ana- 
lyzing trade requires general-equilibrium thinking-partial-equilibrium 
models of labor economies  are inappropriate.3 
My skepticism of the empirical literature arises from the fact that ob- 
served  changes  in employment  and wages  over time are, in principle, 
influenced by changes in demand and supply in the relevant product and 
factor  markets.  A  well-specified  structural  model  that  distinguishes 
exogenous  forcing  variables  (possibly  taste,  technology,  and  policy 
shocks) from endogenous responses,  and takes into account the relevant 
leads,  lags, and expectations,  has to be estimated  with some plausible 
identifying restrictions. As Leamer rightly argues, we are most likely to 
make progress if the empirical model is linked clearly with some under- 
standable theory.  The empirical literature unfortunately fails,  by this 
test, to be convincing. 
Krugman's stylized model certainly provides an understandable the- 
ory. Whether it is more than a way of organizing our thinking for doing 
2.  Leamer (1994). 
3.  The essays  in Bhagwati and Kosters  (1994) provide a cogent  critique of the liter- 
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more serious  empirical work is arguable. His figures 3, 4, and 5 have 
been  collapsed  into my figure DI.  Start from autarky production  and 
consumption  point A. With relative wages and commodity  prices (that 
is,  the slope  of the common  tangent of the production possibility  and 
Samuelson  social indifference curves at A) fixed, the input coefficients 
in production remain unchanged.  At A there is full employment of both 
factors, unskilled and skilled labor, at the initial endowment levels.  Now 
keeping the endowment of skilled labor fully employed,  if we reduce the 
employment of unskilled labor, the production point (at fixed input coef- 
ficients) moves  down the so-called Rybczynski  line ARu. Analogously, 
if we keep the endowment  of unskilled labor fully employed but reduce 
the employment of skilled labor, the production point moves up the Ryb- 
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Now with the relative commodity price fixed, the only way to adjust 
to trade when it is opened  is by adjusting in output and employment. 
Thus  to  generate  the  export  of  skilled-labor-intensive  good  1 in ex- 
change for imports of unskilled-labor-intensive  good 2 supplied by the 
trading partners at the fixed commodity price, production has to move to 
Q along the Rybczynski  line ARu, and consumption  (given homothetic 
preferences) to C along the ray OA. CQ has the same slope as the fixed 
commodity  price ratio. With Q as the origin, the foreign offer curve of 
Krugman's figure 3 will pass through C, so that CO' units of good 2 are 
imported in exchange for O'Q units of good 1. 
The unemployment  of unskilled labor resulting from the shift in pro- 
duction from A to Q can be read by drawing a line parallel to the Ryb- 
czynski  line ARs  to meet the vertical axis at D. Clearly, by assumption, 
along ARs  unskilled labor is fully employed,  so that by choice of units of 
measurement  we  can make ORs  represent the full employment  of un- 
skilled labor. By the same token,  with input coefficients  remaining the 
same, the employment of unskilled labor at Q is the same as at D, and it 
can equal OD by our choice  of units. Thus unemployment  is DRs.  By 
drawing a line parallel to ARs  through C to meet the vertical axis at B, it 
is seen the unskilled labor employment  content of consumption  is OB. 
Thus the unemployment  due to the movement  of consumption  from A 
to C is BRs.  The unemployment  arising from trade is DB, which is less 
than the total unemployment,  DRs,  and DRs/DB  is Krugman's multi- 
plier  effect.  This  indeed  is  the  message  of  "European" adjustment, 
through output  and employment  changes  but with  no  price  or wage 
changes,  to the opening up of trade. 
I depict  the "American" adjustment,  which  allows  price and wage 
changes as well, in figure D2, where OC is the foreign offer curve. Under 
free trade and full employment  of both factors the American, or home, 
offer curve is OF, the slope of which at the origin is the autarky price, 
OA. Thus with price adjustment, equilibrium trade is at T', instead of at 
T as in the "European" case with no adjustment. With the shapes of the 
offer curves as drawn, both the relative price of the unskilled-labor-in- 
tensive  good and the volume of trade are obviously  lower,  at T'. Thus 
allowing prices to adjust reduces the volume of trade to which consump- 
tion and production would have to adjust. Of course,  as we saw earlier, 
the fall in relative price will lower the relative wage of unskilled labor 
enough to keep both factors fully employed. 
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Figure D2.  Adjustment under the "American" Model 
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on it, I must admit to some skepticism  as to their significance.  The nu- 
merical calibrations that Krugman uses for his trade model might indeed 
capture the initial equilibrium configuration. However,  in order to move 
from one  equilibrium to another one  has to make functional  form as- 
sumptions as well. Krugman is candid in recognizing this when he says, 
"the model will be made Cobb-Douglas  throughout." I am not as confi- 
dent as he that the unitary elasticities  of substitution  are not "too far 
from most  empirical  estimates."  Perhaps for  the  purposes  he  has  in 
mind, namely,  to demonstrate nonzero but modest effects  of adjusting 
to trade 'a  la Europe or ai la America,  the simulations are adequate.  In 
any case,  compared to most of the empirical estimates  in the literature, 
which  are not  adequately  grounded in some  well-specified  economic 
theory, Krugman's simulation at least has the virtue of coherence! 
General  Discussion 
A number of panelists  questioned  the adequacy of Krugman's basic 
model for explaining unemployment.  Maurice Obstfeld suggested  that 
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it to understate the effect  on unemployment.  In Krugman's model the 
decline in the low-skill-intensive  domestic  industry only affects the un- 
employment  of  low-skilled  workers;  high-skilled  workers  displaced 
from this industry are readily absorbed in the expanded  skill-intensive 
industry. This expansion employs some fraction of the unskilled as well. 
Under the extreme  assumption  that labor is completely  immobile and 
assuming Krugman's factor intensities,  a decline in the low-skill-inten- 
sive industry would give rise to 50 percent greater unemployment than in 
Krugman's calculations.  Krugman discussed  whether the nontradable 
sector  itself  is low-skill-intensive.  Against  Cooper's  example  of retail 
trade, Krugman offered school  teachers,  doctors,  and chiropractors as 
types of skill-intensivejobs  in the nontradable sector. He cited empirical 
research  by  Borjas,  Freeman,  and Katz  which  indicates  that traded 
goods are slightly less skill-intensive  than nontraded goods. 
William Nordhaus suggested several feature of unemployment and 
the job market that were not captured by Krugman's simple model. Un- 
employment in Europe does not appear to be concentrated in one age or 
skill group, and net job  losses  in import-competing  industries conceal 
significant job creation.  Between  1973 and 1988 the apparel industry in 
the United  States experienced  job destruction  of  14.4 percent and job 
creation  of  10.8 percent,  according  to John Haltiwanger.  These  facts 
demonstrate that trade is only one of several influences on the labor mar- 
ket and imply that disentangling trade from factors such as technology 
will not be easy. 
Nordhaus  provided  evidence  that the  ratio of  shipments  to  value 
added for U.S.  manufacturing establishments  is actually smaller today 
than in 1930. Unless  it turns out that particular tradable industries have 
evolved  differently than these overall data indicate,  this evidence  calls 
into question Krugman's suggestion that "slicing up the value chain" is 
an important factor in explaining the increase  in trade. While agreeing 
that trade liberalization in developing countries has played a key role in 
the dra  matic acceleration  in the world trade-to-GDP ratio since  1985, 
Maurice Obstfeld felt that Krugman gave too little attention to other fac- 
tors. Trade in services  has expanded  as a proportion of overall trade, 
reducing the significance of transport costs.  And treaties,  the develop- 
ment of commercial law, greater familiarity with foreign business  prac- 
tices,  and developments  in capital markets which  reduce  the cost  of 
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There was some discussion  of the difficulty in establishing a baseline 
for the growth of trade so as to be able to assess  the importance of trade 
liberalization and other political changes.  Krugman suggested that it is 
not obvious  that the trade share should  rise with  income.  One trend 
working in the opposite  direction  is that the share of nontradables in 
spending tends to rise as GDP rises. He reported research by Vern Hen- 
derson  showing  that single-industry  towns  in the  United  States  may 
have over 50 percent of their employment outside of their main industry, 
but in Brazil the proportion is 30 to 40 percent.  This suggests  that eco- 
nomic growth may actually increase  the demand for locally  produced 
goods and services.  In the same vein, world growth may spread the dis- 
tribution of capital and technology. 
The discussion  turned to the importance of immigration to wage in- 
equality.  Benjamin Friedman observed  that certain low-skill jobs in the 
nontradable sector  seem to be performed disproportionately  by immi- 
grants for example, janitors, hotel staff, and barbers. In the presence  of 
a shrinking demand for low-skill labor in the tradable sector, this would 
imply that immigration policy is important for the trend in wage inequal- 
ity.  He  suggested  that a policy  favoring  high-skill  immigrants might 
make sense,  especially  since  other policies  to deal with inequality ap- 
pear to  be  extremely  expensive.  For example,  citing  an estimate  by 
James Heckman,  he noted that a program seeking to amend the falling 
fortunes  of the lowest  income  quintile via human capital investments 
would have a bill approaching two trillion dollars. 
William Brainard suggested  that even  if economists  do not consider 
immigration policy,  politicians will. Throughout U.S.  history, immigra- 
tion policy has tended to change with the employment  situation. Today 
it is certainly an important issue in California. Krugman noted that the 
movement  of southern European guest workers between jobs in north- 
ern Europe has diminished, with a negative net migration from southern 
to northern Europe since  1973. However,  Richard Cooper thought this 
can be explained  by the fact that southern Europe has been booming, 
and is not necessarily  due to policy changes in the north. 376  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1995 
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